HubSpot ( HUBS ) is a marketing software as a service platform – competing with SalesForce ( CRM ). HUBS is down 53% YTD. Revenue up 23% YOY (5 Y CAGR 28%) and operating income up from -23M to +29M YOY (1Q2026). Asset/Liabilities is 2,1x and Income/Liabilities is 0,025.

HUBS trades at a fwd 2026
– PE 50,
– PB 4.2,
– EV/FCF 10.3 and a
– EV/EBITDA 8.5.

Analysts expects a 2028
– PE 21,
– PB 2.2,
– EV/FCF 4.6 and a
– EV/EBITDA 4.3.

(Marketscreener, 2026).

In short; HUBS recently went profitable and is growing revenue massively while expanding margins. HUBS is trading at a premium. Currently debt is not an issue; but income/liabilities has room for improvement.

HUBS differentiate from CRM by competing in the mid tier segment – with an intuitive plug and play solution. CRM is competing in the premium segment – with an highly customizable solution (often requiring consultancy).

HUBS has around 300,000 customers; twice of CRM’s about 150.000 customers.

HUBS has 3Billion revenue. CRM has 40Billion revenue. CRM is more profitable; and will likely remain so, as their target audience is less price sensitive. HUBS has recently been upscalling and has it as part of their strategy – “scalling with their customers”.

This makes them a more directly competitor to CRM; and will most likely increase margins in the long term. Moving up market increases CAC (longer time to setup); but increases CLV (less price sensitive). Furthermore, with SaaS the incremental costs of acquiring one customer falls relatively to revenue thus increasing margins with scale. It is thus likely that margins will increase over time, as HUBS expands. HUBS income margin >1%, CRM income margin 18%.

HUBS has been taking market share (revenue) from SalesForce; using a peer group consisting of Klaviyo, Hubspot, SalesForce, Twilio, Braze, Sprout Social & SprinklR.

Here HUBS marketshare grew from 4 to 6%; CRM fell from 83 to 78%. Note. CRM grew in this period. HUBS advantage is heavily nested in the low upfront cost compared to CRM; these costs might come down as AI makes industry wide changes (quicker and more efficient implementation). CRM might also make other product changes; that improves their competitive situation in the mid segment; potentially stealing market share or slowing growth.

Both HUBS and CRM offers the full marketing suite – but both allows for API’s. These API’s like Sprout Social and Braze; might capture a larger share of customer share of wallet – as technical superior features increases leverage. Though, they are not a 1:1 competitor.

While Teleperformance adjusted PE at around 5 appears attractive; several red flags emerges.

SalesForce, STP, AP, Concentrix etc. are all making AI agents. It seems quite likely these are going to ease away at TP’s market share as the technology improves. One might even consider a future with 90% of customer service being managed by agents. This will significantly affect revenue and margins in the mid term. Price is no longer hourly, but solution based. Currently TP’s situation is quite gloomy, but the fact is the technology is not there yet. Customers are still reluctant to talk with agents; and in generel human contact is in many cases needed.

TP’s mix of agents and humans, is the obvious choice at this stage.

My point is; TP is fairly priced at a slight 5% annual contraction in net income; Will grow faster or slower than that?

I won’t give TP any credit for their renewed focus on AI. That is because TP’s verticals and horizontals, are all developing agents. TP should focus on competencies and capabilities; and not entry a hyper competitive market. I think, Instead TP should treat their company as a cash cow – paying out their massive FCF; while growing in specialised customer care and streamlining operations. My biggest bear case, is they seem to be planning to focus on AI agents and expensive acquisitions instead.

Given previously points, it is actually not unlikely that net income is going to fall more than 5% a year. If adoption rates of agents increase anywhere near the current baseline, then TP’s revenue might fall 10% a year – or even significantly drop in 3-5 years time, when one of the many competitors solves agents for customer service. Revenue might even increase slightly or hold steady, but if capital expenditures exceed cost of capital, then whom cares … growth is unlikely to be organic.

to summarize

Mismatch between what management wants and shareholders – with a growth at any cost model. Valuation is somewhat fair given earnings outlook.

The company could be an attractive investment,
with a different strategic direction.

Don’t feed the dog, with the cash cow!
Let me invest the excess cash flow!.

Come loose money with me. Accenture is under significant pressure .

Recent Q3 report; signalled low booking growth and an overweight of low margin and long time horizon contract. The market is now viewing Accenture as a stagnating conglomerate. The discrepency between the low pe and the sentiment regarding the stock, is furthermore driven by toxic workplace culture, wage inflation and a disruption in the business model – whereof AI has been fundamentally changing the market.

Consultancy is no longer hourly based – it is output based. This has had a negative effect on the pricing; in favour of customers.

Nonetheless looking at the perceived customer value – consultancy is not going anywhere. There will for the foreseeable time be a need for an skilled workforce – with strong capabilities. In fact lowered prices, have increased bookings in the mid tier segment. Margins might come down – but hey, at least sales are up.

The excessive share buy backs and inorganic growth – hints at a lack of organic growth opportunities. Note – ACN is investing in their employees; up scaling them to better fit future demand [data architecture].

Contrary to common belief – India does provide … The manoeuvrability of Accentures workforce rests on its low retention rate.

So point is – is the current valuation an overreaction; or is Accenture now a stagnating business? Will the use of AI; allow higher % skill consultancies to capture market share as efficiency grows?

I recently stumpled upon Teleperformance SE.
A generic call center & digital service business provider.
Trading at a TTM PE of 8.63.

So why is Teleperformance SE interesting?

One of the most important touch points in the customer journey, is the post purchase segment. In this segment, the company can significantly improve the overall customer experience. When a customer calls in, he is likely about to churn. He needs help with a failure point/pain point, that needs quick execution. Teleperformance SE has massive capabilities in this segment. Emphasised by their massive scale and industry leadership.

The company recently appointed a Chief AI Officer, as they are increasingly transitioning into a tech-enabled customer service platform – integrating omnichannel execution with AI solutions.

Most importantly is the increasing need for addressing customers promptly; and not just through own channels. Always on marketing are an essential in the digital age of big social media platforms with open conversations. Teleperformance SE, is providing services that can address just this; and imo, this is going to be the growth driver in the long term.

But can Teleperformance SE tap this rapidly growing market? And will the legacy business, work as an drag on growth rates and FCF?

The market is currently voting an astounding no!; Emphasised by the dirt cheap valuation. The company is priced as a stagnating business in a legacy industry. The main bear thesis imo is companies pivoting to internally organised customer management.

2026 EV/FCF 8.33x
2026 PE 6.18x

2026 Net Income Margin 4.87%
2026 Return on Assets 6.16%

2026 Total Liabilities / Total Assets 64.3%
2025 Net Income / Total Liabilities 6,7%

Analyst expectations: 2028 PE 5.15. Management expects normalisation of revenue growth to about 4%; with increased margins.

Competition is both native call centers attempting the same pivot and consultancy companies helping customers with their customer experiences and co creation. Furthermore, SaaS only companies. Competitors thus include:

– (Call Centers) Concentrix Corporation / TaskUs
– (SaaS/CCaaS) NICE Ltd. / Five9 Inc. / Twilio Inc. / RingCentral / 8×8 Inc.
– (Consultancy) Accenture / Globant

New look at TEP: https://multiplestrategy.com/2026/06/29/in-investing-one-cant-be-afraid-of-every-shadow/

The Anti AI Trade. Companies that the market believes will be disrupted or is overlooking. #The Least Obvious AI Winners.

The idea is picking up industry leaders at discount. In many cases, companies that the market is pricing for near term disruption, severely overstating the capabilities and speed in which AI will be implemented.

Software consultancy’s. When code is cheaper to produce, why pay top bucks for it? The business model is believed to be dead & almost any software consultancy is trading below 50% or more from the top. In reality; these consultancy companies are not just outsourced programmers and chat bots are nowhere near being able to offer consultancy class guidance.

Many major apps or SaaS companies. When code is easier to produce, apps suddenly become easily replicable and thus the technical moat has decreased. In reality, some of these firms have massive data advantages and network effects – along with different organisational structures and competencies, that just can’t be replicated.

Consumer discretionary. Has nothing to with AI – and that is the idea. While money has been flowing to AI, it leaves some industries underlooked and underinvested. The same goes with Healthcare. Whom is trading at closer to historical valuations.

Industry Leaders At A Discount (note, not all discounts are due to AI):

Accenture (#1 Listed software consultancy)

Duolingo (#1 Learning app)

Match Group (#1 Dating app)

Adobe (#1 Creative Software)

Teleperformance (#1 Call & Customer Service)

Rockwool A/S (#1 Listed pure play stone wool)

Netflix (#1 Streaming)

Mercado Libre (#1 Ecommerce Latin America)

Match Groups Goodwill is inherently large proportion wise – after several catastrophic purchases. Capital has been destroyed, so why is it still sitting on the balance sheet? The reason can be found in the remuneration which largely consists of RSU.

RSUs (Time-Based): $217.4 million

PSUs (Performance-Based): $16.8 million

Market-Based (rTSR): $0.8 million

“The value of RSUs with vesting subject only to continued service is based on the fair value of Match Group common stock on the grant date. The value of RSUs that include a market condition is based on fair value estimated using a lattice model. The value of RSUs is expensed as stock-based compensation expense over the applicable vesting term” – (Annual report, 2025).

When an executive’s compensation is heavily weighted toward time-based vesting, their primary operational directive shifts toward self-preservation and the mitigation of short-term stock volatility. Essentially, the management is largely incentivised to keep the share price artificially high, even at cost of long term performance.

This significantly hindering incentives to perform a “kitchen sink strategy”. Where management tanks the stock “by writing off bad goodwill” and perform massive share buybacks to significantly increase earnings per share.

To summarize –

The board has designed a remuneration program that penalizes transparency. Management is structurally incentivized to maintain the accounting illusion of historical acquisitions, deferring impairments to protect the cash value of their time-based equity.